SECRET PAGE 001 CIA MAR 92 24 CIA TO: PRIORITY DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA WASHINGTON DC, USTR. TREASURY DEPT, DEPT OF COMMERCE, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, JICPAC HONOLULU HI. THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM;

NSA FOR ZKZK OO ZRL DE (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);

STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR; DIA

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA AND PASS NWS (DIRECTOR ONLY);

TREASURY EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

(NATIONAL SECURITY); USTR: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE US TRADE

(NATIONAL SECURITY); USTR: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE

OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON; EXCLUSIVE FOR USCINCPAC; EXCLUSIVE

FOR COMMANDER JICPAC. PASS: FOR COMMANDER JICPAC. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 24 MARCH 1992 DIST:

COUNTRY:

VIETNAM/JAPAN/CHINA

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: FEB 2001

SUBJ:

JAPANESE INTENTION TO INTERVENE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON BEHALF OF VIETNAM IN POW/MIA TALKS; VIETNAMESE VIEW

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 002 24

MAR 92

CIA

ON LATEST ROUND OF POW/MIA TALKS IN HANOI

- 2. FOLLOWING THE 31 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY 1992 VISIT OF THE SPECIAL (U.S.) PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS TO HANOI, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM ((YUSHITA)) HIROYUKI COMMENTED TO OTHER DIPLOMATS POSTED IN HANOI THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY VIETNAMESE POREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN MANH ((CAM)) THAT THE LATEST ROUND OF POM/MIA TALKS HAD BEEN "100 PERCENT SUCCESSFUL." IN A BRIEFING, CAM TOLD YUSHITA THAT VIETNAM HAD MET EVERY REQUIREMENT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, SUCH AS THE U.S. REQUEST THAT VIETNAM APPOINT A "LIVE SIGHTING" OFFICIAL. CAM ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. ENVOY HAD INDICATED TO HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SATISFIED WITH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS TO DATE ON THIS ISSUE.
- THAT CAM HAD ASKED HIM TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE UNITED STATES TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE. YUSHITA SAID HE INTENDS TO "PLAY A BIGGER ROLE" AND TOLD CAM THAT HE WILL TRY TO INTERVENE WITH THE UNITED STATES. YUSHITA ADDED THAT HE TOLD CAM THAT HE (YUSHITA) BELIEVES THE UNITED STATES WILL PARTIALLY LIFT THE EMBARGO BY MAY, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD BE EXPECTED TO INITIATE NEW KINDS OF OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM AT THAT TIME (NFI). YUSHITA SAID HE ADVISED CAM THAT IF THE UNITED STATES BELIEVED THAT AID COULD NOT BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO VIETNAM,

YUSHITA INDICATED TO THE DIPLOMATS THAT HE PLANNED TO ADVISE TOKYO
THAT VIETNAM HAD SHOWN VERY POSITIVE BEHAVIOR IN TALKS WITH THE U.S.
ENVOY AND HAD AGREED TO ALL THAT WAS ASKED BY THE U.S. DELEGATES.
YUSHITA SAID HE BELIEVES HE CAN INFLUENCE U.S. OFFICIALS ON THE
SUBJECT.
FORWARD-LEANING STANCE IN VIETNAM REGARDLESS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
U.S. POLICY.)
WAS EXPRESSING HIS OWN VIEWS OR THOSE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 003 24 MAR 92

CIA

CANNOT BE DETERMINED.)

AMBASSADORS FROM JAPAN, RUSSIA, INDONESIA, AND CHINA WERE AMBASSADOR HAD NO REACTION TO YUSHITA'S REMARKS. AFTER THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR LEFT, THE RUSSIAN AND INDONESIAN AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD WORK TOGETHER WITH JAPAN TO TRY TO BALANCE THE INCREASING INPLUENCE OF CHINA OVER VIETNAM. SUPPORTING THE JAPANESE APPROACH TO THE U.S. WOULD BE ONE WAY THEY COULD WORK TOGETHER.

5.

REPORTED TO HANOI THAT THE U.S. REACTION TO THE LATEST ROUND OF TALKS ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE IS THAT VIETNAM IS "DRAGGING ITS FEET" ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE, IN PART BECAUSE 1992 IS AN ELECTION YEAR IN THE U.S. COMMENTED THAT THIS FOOT-DRAGGING MOULD NOT BE BENEFICIAL TO VIETNAM BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT REGARD RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM AS A PRIORITY ISSUE.



FACE 004
24
MAR 92 CIA

END OF MESSAGE

•